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ABSTRACT 
 National immigration policy meets the realities of unauthorized 
immigration at the local level, often in ways undesired by residents, as 
exemplified by the dramatic rise of local anti-immigrant legislation in US states 
and municipalities.  Scholars have studied why some states and municipalities, 
but not others, engage in immigration policymaking.  Such research is not 
designed, however, to evaluate how the structure of American government 
facilitates and shapes local protest.  To probe that issue, we compare Chiapas in 
Mexico and Arizona, both peripheral areas significantly affected by unauthorized 
immigration and national policies designed to control it.  We find that the open 
texture of American federalism facilitates local activism, while Mexico’s more 
centralized government does not.  Activists within both states are similar, 
however, in deploying law creatively to critique national policy, a reminder of the 
growing worldwide significance of legal pluralism and legal consciousness in the 
politics of protest.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 We are witnessing the slow, painful, unraveling of a world order in which 
nation states, jealous of their sovereignty, could plausibly claim to control the 
right to enter and remain within the national territory.  Political leaders continue 
to assure us that they can “secure the borders” and eliminate unauthorized 
immigration, but it is increasingly obvious that these are unachievable goals.  
Porous borders and transnational affiliations are realities of our times (Benhabib 
2005).  The call to put more “boots on the ground” in border areas has 
nevertheless become a potent political rallying cry in many nations of the world, 
reflecting widespread anxiety about national security and seemingly uncontrolled 
and uncontrollable changes in economy and society. 
 The nation state’s inability to live up to its promises of a secure border is 
felt most keenly in border communities, which are crossing points for 
unauthorized immigrants on their way to other destinations, as well as places of 
temporary and permanent settlement (Rojas 2007).  In the borderlands, 
unauthorized immigration is perceived as a local issue, with implications for 
public services, public safety, and the local economy. The isolation of these 
communities, typically far from national capitals, encourages practices suited to 
local circumstances and may spur resistance to outside intervention (Andreas 
2001).  It is worthwhile, therefore to consider how center and periphery 
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communicate with each other in matters related to unauthorized immigration, and 
in particular, how border localities make their voices heard at the national level.   
 The ability of these communities to speak effectively to national policy 
makers depends on whether local political institutions are strong enough to 
formulate a coherent position and communicate it upwards.  The United States is 
distinctive in this respect.  Alexis de Tocqueville, touring the United States in the 
early 1800s, noted its dense network of local institutions and elaborate system of 
local government.  These characteristics have endured.  The federal government 
routinely relies on local administration to carry out some policies.  A recent 
immigration-related example is the Secure Communities Program, which requires 
that localities report to federal authorities all suspected unauthorized immigrants 
booked into local jails.  The dense network of local institutions and habits of 
inter-level communication also facilitate the expression of local dissatisfaction 
with national policy.  The United States may be unusual, in other words, not in its 
level of racialized anxiety about unauthorized immigration, but in the ability of its 
people, through local government, to make their concerns felt at higher levels.  
 The effort to explain the rapid rise in local immigration-policy activism in 
the United States has engaged American scholars on several fronts.  Some argue 
that local laws hostile toward unauthorized immigrants are a reaction to rapid 
settlement in “new destinations” (e.g. Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008).  
Others assert the significance of Republican dominance in producing such 
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legislation (Chavez and Provine 2009, Lewis, Provine, Varsanyi, and Decker 
2012, Boehm 2012, Ramiksharian and Wong 2010).  There is some disagreement 
over the extent to which local lawmaking is intended simply to supplement 
federal authority or to challenge it (see e.g. Wells 2004, Newton 2012, Varsanyi 
2010). The role that states and municipalities play in the enforcement of 
immigration law under the emerging federal policy of devolution is also a matter 
of scholarly interest (Provine and Varsanyi 2012).  
 This study takes a step back from all of this research to focus on the 
capacity of local communities to speak back to power at the national level.  
Capacity requires both the availability of institutionalized channels of 
communication that cut across levels of government and sufficient political 
experience at the local level to effectively give voice to local objections.  Such a 
project requires reaching beyond the US case.  Our strategy was to choose two 
borderland states -- one in the US and the other in a less elaborated federal system 
-- and to study the trajectory of immigration-related political activism in each.  
Arizona in the United States and Chiapas in Mexico provide useful comparison 
cases because, while differing in many ways, they are similar in being on the 
national periphery, with high levels of immigration and a history of problematic 
relationships with their central governments.  
 Like border communities everywhere, Chiapas and Arizona feel the push-
pull of national policies that seek to maintain border controls, while at the same 
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time attempting to increase foreign trade and investment, attract highly skilled 
workers, and facilitate tourism.  These contradictory national demands, along with 
pressure to retain a decent human-rights record in an era of growing economic 
inequality and desperation, are negotiated on a daily basis in borderlands.  At the 
national level, however, the contradictions of actual border management tend to 
be poorly understood or completely unappreciated. 
 The southern borders of Mexico and the United States have taken on new 
significance as both nations have prioritized immigration enforcement. The first 
task of this article is to look more closely at this development from a local 
perspective. The next step is to analyze the opportunities and constraints that 
shape local protest directed at national decision-makers.  A major constraint, of 
course, is the assertion by national governments of their sovereignty in matters 
related to immigration, an assertion that applies, not just to domestic courts and to 
foreign nations, but also to all governmental units under the national umbrella.  
The capacity of central government to control its outermost regions, however, and 
the degree to which it must listen to these regions, is variable over time and space, 
and so should be considered a matter for empirical investigation.   
 While our comparative case study of Arizona and Chiapas reveals 
significant differences in the capacity of these local communities to effectively 
voice opposition to national policy, there is a striking similarity in the preference 
of activists in each place for legalized styles of protest.  This preference for law 
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may be traceable in part to the fact that governance in large contemporary states 
encompasses multiple levels of law, creating a kind of officially sanctioned legal 
pluralism.  Meta-national human-rights norms and institutions add to this 
layering, creating opportunities to challenge political decisions through law.  
Legalized forms of protest also attract activists because of law’s normative 
dimension.  Law inserts a moral “ought” into political protest and evokes the idea 
of rights, a framing that can be useful in legislative lobbying, media campaigns, 
and public protest (McCann 2006).  In the process legal consciousness deepens 
and spreads, even in nations with more centralization than prevails in the United 
States (e.g. Chua 2012).    
 Immigration enforcement is a complex matter in border areas.  Licit and 
illicit trade across national boundaries can create an insular local economy or even 
a “semi-autonomous social field” (Moore 1973) that resists external oversight 
because not all of its practices would be sanctioned by the broader legal system 
(Andreas 2001).  Isolation from the national mainstream can also foster a sense 
among residents that they have been neglected and deemed unimportant (Nevins 
2002).  Familial and ethnic relations and residues of a pre-bordered past further 
complicate the local mindset.  Johnson and Graybill (2010) argue for taking this 
perspective more seriously, recognizing the contingent nature of the nation state 
and the importance of sub-national histories in defining it.   
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 Arizona and Chiapas furnish apt exemplars, steeped as they have been in 
cross-border trade, work, and settlement, and operating with memories of a long 
pre-enforcement history.  In both cases large indigenous populations settled in the 
area before the two nations created a legal border.  For many decades, both 
indigenous and non-indigenous populations carried on their activities without 
much interference from federal authorities.  Businesses depended on visitors from 
the other side.  In Arizona during the World War I era, US authorities did try to 
control the border because of security concerns.  Two federal statutes designed to 
seal the border, the Immigration Act of 1917 and the Passport Act of 1918, reflect 
this intention.  But Kang’s review of the files of federal agents stationed on the 
Southwest border reveals angry protests from locals and requests for exceptions 
that soon swamped federal strictures, re-establishing earlier patterns of border 
commerce and travel: “Indeed, throughout the agency’s history, border residents 
have been some of the most vehement and persistent opponents of any regulation 
that threatened to encroach upon their freedom of movement across the 
international line” (Kang 181, 2010).  Between 1910 and 1920, in the face of anti-
travel initiatives at the national level, 1.5 million Mexicans entered the United 
States (Ibid). 
  Local pressure in the opposing direction, to increase enforcement, requires 
a more overtly political strategy involving complaints to federal representatives 
and attention-drawing local politicking.  Decisions President Clinton and 
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Congress made in the 1990s furnish an example.  Apparently inspired by growing 
anti-immigrant sentiment and political activity in California and other 
Southwestern states, President Clinton embraced two border-strengthening 
initiatives, Operation Hold the Line in El Paso, Texas, in 1993, and Operation 
Gatekeeper in San Diego, California, in 1994.   The border’s vast desert region, 
deemed too hostile for easy passage, was left only lightly patrolled.  This 
approach was soon to have significant implications for Arizona, which up until 
that time had mostly local traffic across its southern border.   
 Pressure to gain more control over unauthorized immigration continued as 
Congress in 1996 adopted two major pieces of legislation, that, among other 
things, increased penalties for illegal entry, invited local participation in federal 
immigration enforcement, reduced immigrant rights, and attempted to reduce the 
“magnet” of benefits and jobs that were presumed to attract unauthorized 
immigrants.  During this period the size and budget of the Border Patrol began to 
grow rapidly.  (It has now quintupled, growing from about 4,000 to over 20,000 
agents.)   
 Mexico was also feeling the effect of the U.S. job magnet in the late 
1990s, and increasingly finding itself receiving immigrants from Central America, 
mostly bound for the United States, even as more of its own nationals migrated 
northward.  Neither of these trends was new for Mexico, but their dimensions 
were for the first time drawing national and international attention. The 
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September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington further 
heightened attention to border issues in Mexico.  On both the U.S. and Mexican 
southern borders, the presence and activities of large numbers of federal 
immigration-control agents soon became part of the local landscape, while at the 
same time increasing the vulnerability of unauthorized immigrants to every form 
of exploitation and criminal victimization, including abuse from over-zealous 
border-patrol personnel.  The effects have been felt on local residents as well as 
migrants.  In Douglas, Arizona, for example, businesses complain that the 
increased difficulty of crossing the border has driven away Mexican shoppers; as 
one remarked: “There’s a lot of money being lost in the name of security” (Santos 
2012a). 
 This history features law on all sides.  The federal governments in Mexico 
and the United States have justified legislation supporting their increased presence 
on the border in legal terms, arguing that the ascertainment of legal status is 
crucial to promoting national security.  Arizona lawmakers have taken this 
approach a step further, drawing new legal distinctions at the state level and 
designing new enforcement modalities to deflect and deter unauthorized 
immigrants.  Pro-immigrant activists in Arizona and Chiapas also rely on law, 
particularly human-rights standards, to argue for changes in national policy; treaty 
obligations and constitutional guarantees also factor into their arguments.  In 
Chiapas, in contrast to Arizona, local legislation has been adopted that pointedly 
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overlooks legal status.  All of these activities reveal belief in the capacity of law 
to reframe people and their role in society in fundamental ways (de Genova 
2002), or in Coutin’s words, to “define not only national borders, but also spaces 
of existence within national territories” (2001, 118).  Arizona and Chiapas 
activists would agree with Ngai (2004, 4) that it is law that makes unauthorized 
immigrants “impossible subjects,” but they would add that law can also lend 
credence political arguments in the increasingly law-saturated environments in 
which contemporary societies operate (Hirschl 2006, Kagan 2001, Epp 2011).   
IMMIGRATION ACTIVISM IN ARIZONA 
 The state known as Arizona was once part of Mexico.  The Arizona 
Territory dates from the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the Gadsden 
Purchase in 1853.  These treaties added a vast area to the United States, including 
most of present-day Arizona and also California, Utah, Nevada, and parts of New 
Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming.  The treaties allowed Mexicans residing in the 
new US territories to claim American citizenship, treating Mexicans as legally 
“white” so as not to violate the federal law that restricted citizenship to whites. 
This arrangement, designed to resolve diplomatic issues between Mexico and the 
United States, aroused concerns among Anglos that Mexicans and indigenous 
residents would have too much political influence.  The solution was to divide the 
area into two states, with New Mexico absorbing most of the non-whites.  
Arizona and New Mexico became states in 1912.  That same year Arizona 
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adopted an English literacy test for voting.  Requirements for minimum 
education, local property ownership and minimum periods of residency all 
worked to disenfranchise Mexican-American voters from influence in local 
politics (Perales 2013). 
 Arizona’s early preoccupation with the presumed negative influence of 
Mexican-origin people became a distinctive feature of its politics.  Conflicts were 
common as Anglos asserted dominance.  Mexican-Americans worked in Arizona 
copper mines at less than half the Anglo wage, provoking strikes and labor unrest 
(Gordon 1999).  The reaction to strikers was often violent.  In 1917, the town of 
Bisbee Arizona responded to demands for better wages and working conditions 
from miners of mostly Mexican origin by deporting over 1,000 foreign workers 
and their allies.  With the help of the local sheriff and deputized residents, the 
miners were herded into manure-laden boxcars and shipped east under armed 
guard into the New Mexico desert, where they were abandoned, later to be 
rescued by U.S. soldiers stationed in the area (Bailey 1983).   
 Segregation, with Mexican-Americans treated as a separate race, was legal 
in Arizona until 1953, when the Arizona Supreme Court declared the practice 
unconstitutional.  Segregation had been the policy, not just in the public schools, 
but also at public swimming pools, parks, and churches.  Neighborhoods were 
segregated by race, with this arrangement backed up by racially restrictive 
covenants in deeds.  The Latino presence at the state’s universities and in the 
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professions was minimal in this period.  Their presence in the state’s agriculture, 
mining, construction, and service sectors, however, was large and economically 
important.  Yet their numbers were easy to ignore because of their political 
disenfranchisement and lack of citizenship.  In Arizona, as in the neighboring 
states of New Mexico and California, many whites regarded Mexican Americans 
as workers whose real roots lay in Mexico (Gomez 2007, Chavez 2008).   
 The demise of legal segregation and rising concern about civil rights and 
racial discrimination changed the rules, but not the belief in powerful quarters that 
Anglo culture must remain dominant in Arizona.  During the 1960s, Operation 
Eagle Eye excluded many Arizona Latinos from voting.  The state challenged the 
federal government’s 1970 ban on literacy tests in court; since then it has had 
continual difficulties getting its redistricting plans approved as non-discriminatory 
against Latino voters (Perales).  The state legislature made English the state’s 
official language in 1988, but a state court declared that law unconstitutional.  
 Immigration was not a salient issue at this time, in part because political 
leaders had not yet made it one, and in part because, despite some political gains, 
Arizona’s Mexican-American residents “knew their place.”  Living in Arizona as 
an unauthorized immigrant was not difficult if one did not get into serious trouble.  
Even when arrests occurred, federal authorities were not always notified, and 
even if notified, did not necessarily act on the information they received.  The 
border was porous, with migrants from Mexico crossing into and out of Arizona 
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without much difficulty.  Federal immigration officials were a minor presence in 
the state and conducted no raids.  This situation, although it was not evident at the 
time, was about to change. 
The emergence of concerns about border security 
 With Operation Gatekeeper’s addition of 1000 border patrol agents in San 
Diego, Mexican and Central American migrants began to re-route their northward 
journey through the lightly patrolled Arizona desert.  As this traffic grew, so did 
the number of border deaths caused by harsh conditions, increasing from nine in 
1990 to 201 by 2005 (Rubio-Goldsmith et al., 2006).
i
  These developments 
changed the way that many Arizonans viewed unauthorized immigrants.  Border 
crossing could no longer be viewed simply as a way for Mexican workers to come 
to the state on a temporary basis.  The new reality was large numbers who passed 
through Arizona in order to reach destinations further in the interior.  More 
migrants were also settling permanently in the state with their families because of 
the increasing difficulty of moving back and forth across the border.  The 
increasingly treacherous border also increased human smuggling operations and 
predatory kidnapping around the Arizona border.  Because of increased controls, 
much more money could be earned transporting migrants than had ever been true 
before.  
 These new dangers spurred the growth of already existing grassroots 
organizations like the American Friends Service Committee and the creation of 
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new groups dedicated to preventing harm to migrants and to advocating on behalf 
of their rights.  Border Action Network was formed in 1999.  Its “Twelve Political 
Principles” include the right to live and work in the United States, basic human 
services, family reunification, and respect for immigrant contributions (BAN 
2012).  In 2003, religious leaders in Tucson, Arizona, which lies relatively close 
to the border with Mexico, began meeting out of frustration with the growing 
numbers of migrant deaths in the desert.  Within a year they had formed No More 
Deaths, a human-rights organization aiding migrants with medical help and 
watering stations and, at a policy level, advocating for a more humane 
immigration policy (NMD 2012).  The Kino Border Initiative, made up of 
religious organizations on both sides of the border, was founded in 2009 with the 
mission of humanitarian assistance for migrants and the transformation of local, 
regional, and national immigration policies.  
 These organizations and others like them deploy various strategies to press 
for change in U.S. immigration policy and Arizona law.  They have co-sponsored 
marches of unprecedented size and conduct vigorous public-education campaigns, 
but a significant and growing part of their work focuses on law and rights.  They 
investigate and document abuses that migrants suffer, framing their analyses 
around human rights principles and protections under American law.  Their 
efforts include close scrutiny of state legislative proposals, formal complaints to 
federal officials for violations of immigrant rights, and sometimes lawsuits.  
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Violations of the law by border patrol agents are a special focus of concern.  Law 
and legality, in short, play a central role in their advocacy. 
The legislature crafts its protest through law  
 Political leaders in Arizona have also focused on law, both as a means to 
gain control of unauthorized immigration and as a way to broadcast their 
dissatisfaction with the status quo.  Arizona legislators took notice in 1994 when 
neighboring California enacted Proposition 187, a very popular citizens’ initiative 
that showcased the state’s resolve to deflect and discourage unauthorized 
immigrants by denying them essential services.  Although a federal court quickly 
declared most of Proposition 187 unconstitutional, its passage and the publicity it 
generated showed how a state law could be used politically to push for more 
restrictive legislation at a national level, with political benefits to its proponents.  
 Opinion about the government in Washington, never very favorable in 
Arizona, was at a low point in this period.  The increased flow of immigrants to 
and through the state had fueled a pervasive sense that Arizona’s vital interests 
had been sacrificed to Washington politics.  The failure of the federal government 
to fully reimburse the state’s costs for imprisoning unauthorized immigrants 
convicted of state-level crimes was a particular sore point (McDowell and Provine 
2013).   
 The Arizona legislature’s Republican leadership, aroused to action on 
behalf of its mostly conservative Anglo constituent base, began to develop its own 
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immigration policies.  The goal at first was to discourage unauthorized 
immigrants from settling in the state by cutting off services and criminalizing 
their employment.  The legislature began passing such bills in 2003, but then-
governor Janet Napolitano, a Democrat, vetoed them, arguing that immigration 
enforcement is solely a federal responsibility, which led her opponents to label 
her “the illegal-alien governor.” 
 Governor Napolitano did sign one law in 2005 that proved to have a 
pronounced negative effect on unauthorized immigrants in the state.  The statute 
was ostensibly designed to combat human smuggling, but its language was 
capacious enough to permit the Maricopa County prosecutor to charge immigrants 
as co-conspirators in their own smuggling.
ii
  Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph 
Arpaio, a recent convert to the campaign to drive out unauthorized immigrants, 
began aggressively to enforce this statute, and in the process became a nationally 
known figure.  Within six weeks of the law’s effective date, the Sheriff and his 
deputies, assisted by a 250-person posse, had made 147 arrests.  In a 2006 
interview on Fox News the Sheriff explained his position to a national audience: 
“It’s a violation of the law, and I’m going to put tents up from here to Mexico if I 
have to, to keep these illegals incarcerated.” (La Jeunesse 2006).   
 Republican leaders at this point sponsored a series of ballot initiatives, a 
favorite means of bypassing the traditional legislative process (and gubernatorial 
veto potential) in Arizona and many Western states.
iii 
 This strategy worked 
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(Sinema 2012).  In 2006 -- against the advice of the governor, mayors in major 
metropolitan areas, and Arizona’s entire Congressional delegation -- large 
majorities of citizens voted to deny college students without legal status the 
benefit of in-state tuition rates at state universities.  Initiatives that year also 
denied unauthorized immigrants access to state welfare services, including adult 
English-language classes, and access to bail in serious criminal cases.  Voters 
made English the state’s official language, to be given priority in all state- 
government communication. 
 The perceived inability of Congress to agree upon comprehensive 
immigration reform made Governor Napolitano’s hands-off position increasingly 
untenable.  By 2007, she was persuaded to sign a bill penalizing employers who 
knowingly hire unauthorized workers with loss of their state-issued business 
licenses.  The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Legal Arizona Workers Act in May 
2011.
iv
  Despite its ostensible focus on employers, Arizona’s sanctions have been 
limited almost entirely to immigrant workers, with only minor disruptions for two 
businesses, one of which was already in bankruptcy proceedings.  Plascencia’s 
study of the 55 “operations” conducted under this law concludes that enforcement 
was never aimed at businesses, but rather “the ‘force of law’ appears to be 
ultimately aimed principally at disciplining migrants without employment 
authorization” (2012).   
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 The next step was to bring federal immigration law into the realm of 
ordinary law enforcement.  Congress had encouraged partnerships with federal 
immigration agents in the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, which offered training to prepare local law-enforcement 
officers to assist in immigration enforcement.  The law attracted little interest for 
most of its first decade, but in 2006 Sheriff Arpaio arranged for sixty deputies to 
receive training.  Soon his deputies began to arrest scores of unauthorized 
immigrants, sometimes by raiding their places of employment.  Maricopa County 
became a national leader in the number of deportations arising from arrests by 
local law-enforcement officers. 
 The sheriff’s raids became notorious, particularly after one of them 
occurred without warning at midnight in a municipal library in Mesa, Arizona, a 
city that had decided against aggressive immigration enforcement. The resulting 
controversy and persistent complaints about racial profiling and excesses in other 
raids eventually forced the federal government to revoke the agreement it had 
signed with Sheriff Arpaio, but by then the state legislature had prepared its own 
legislation authorizing immigration arrests by local police. The announced goal of 
the 2010 law, known as SB1070, was “attrition through enforcement,” to be 
achieved through a potpourri of provisions, all directed toward the removal of 
unauthorized immigrants from the state. Most controversially, local police gained 
authority to inquire about immigration status in any stop if the officer suspected 
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that the person might not have legal status. Failure to implement this policy to the 
fullest exposed the law-enforcement agency to civil suit by any Arizona citizen.  
 SB1070 was immediately controversial because of the obvious likelihood 
of pretextual stops and racial profiling. The surge of protest locally, nationally, 
and even internationally dramatically expanded the visibility of Arizona as a site 
of struggle over immigration, and exposed the state to boycotts protesting the 
legislation.  Seven lawsuits were filed to overturn the law, including one by the 
federal government.  In July 2012 the US Supreme Court declared that three 
sections interfered with federal immigration law, but the Court let stand, at least 
temporarily, the section allowing local officers to question immigration status in 
the course of a stop or arrest.  In February 2013 researchers at Syracuse 
University reported that Arpaio’s Maricopa County jail had more immigrants with 
federal detainers than any other facility in the nation, including much larger cities 
like Los Angeles with far larger immigrant populations (TRAC 2013). 
 SB1070 was, in a sense, the capstone of the Arizona legislature’s effort to 
craft its own immigration-control program.  The goals were practical, but also 
political, the object being to nudge the federal government toward restrictive 
action by showing that an enforcement-only approach is feasible and popular with 
voters.  For a time, SB1070’s popularity, and look-alike statutes in several other 
states seemed to dampen talk at the national level of a path toward citizenship for 
immigrants without legal status.  In Arizona it bolstered the fortunes of 
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Republicans running for re-election.  Alfredo Gutierrez, a former state senator and 
radio host, describes the attitude among immigrants in the state after the 2010 
electoral victories: “The excitement of four years ago has turned into bitterness; 
hope has turned into fear” (Santos 2012).   
 Fear continues to saturate relationships between Latinos and state officials, 
particularly law enforcement.  There are, however, signs of change brought about 
by the growing power of the Latino vote and political organizing to mobilize this 
constituency. The president of the state senate, one of the most virulent and 
powerful opponents of unauthorized immigrants, lost his position in 2011 through 
a recall election led by Latinos and supported by business and some elements 
within the Mormon church.  At about the same time the county attorney who had 
led the effort to prosecute smuggled immigrants was disbarred.                                                                                                        
 More generally, there appears to be a growing sense that Arizona’s harsh 
approach to its estimated 400,000 unauthorized residents is harmful to business 
and a liability for office-holders. Bills directly attacking the lives of unauthorized 
residents were absent from the 2013 legislative session, though the legislature did 
adopt two laws aimed at reducing the impact of organizations focused on 
increasing the Latino vote.  Legally imbued politics remains the preferred strategy 
for advocates on all sides of the Arizona immigration debate. 
IMMIGRATION ACTIVISM IN CHIAPAS 
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 The current border between Mexico and Guatemala -- over 600 miles long 
-- was not established until 1882, when the two nations signed the Treaty of 
Limits.  The border with Belize makes up the remainder of the 713-mile southern 
edge of Mexico.  The entire region has a large indigenous Mayan-speaking 
population, which helps to explain the area’s long history of cross-border trade 
and travel and a sense of distance from the Mexican state, which has never 
offered indigenous residents the full benefits of citizenship (Colby & Den Berghe 
1961, Cruz Burguete 1998).  For this population, Castillo argues, “international 
borders are something far from their daily dynamics and are therefore a 
meaningless obstacle” to the maintenance of cross-border ties (2003, 37).  At 
present, Chiapas has a population of 4.7 million inhabitants, 27 percent of whom  
speak a Mesoamerican or related language.  Chiapas and the other eleven states in 
central, south, and southeast Mexico contain 90 percent of the nation’s entire 
indigenous population (INEGI 2010).   
 From early in its establishment as Mexican territory, Chiapas attracted 
white settlers interested in agriculture and coffee growing, including immigrants 
from Germany and other parts of Europe (Mahnken 1993). By mid-twentieth 
century, cattle ranching had begun to overtake the smaller farms.  Class and race 
relations grew harsher.  The few thousand ranching families that owned half the 
state forced the Indians off the land, leaving them to work as laborers on coffee 
fincas or as hourly-wage workers.  Around 1960, many of them departed for the 
 22 
Lacandon Jungle, in the rain forest.  After several decades there, they began to 
organize politically to demand their rights. The abuse and impoverishment that 
they had endured, as well as the national government’s decision to change the 
national constitution to reduce communal land ownership, precipitated armed 
conflict in 1994. The Zapatista rebels fought, not just to end discrimination 
against the indigenous population, but also to draw attention to the implications of 
neo-liberal policies promoting free trade and unrestricted development.  
Hostilities broke out, not coincidentally, on the day that Mexico signed the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (Collins 2010).   
 The Mexican government responded to the Zapatista uprising with 
military force and harassment of peasant groups, not with financial aid.  Chiapas, 
despite its rich supplies of hydroelectric power and large forests, remains 
Mexico’s poorest state with a poverty rate of 75.5 percent (Johnson 2008).  Over 
half of the population lives in communities of 2,500 people or fewer.  Severe 
hurricanes and flooding have also taken a toll on the area.   As one local resident 
observed: “It’s not true that Chiapas is poor.  Chiapas is rich in natural resources.  
It’s the people of Chiapas who are poor” (Farmer 1998, 14).  
 In the 1980s neighboring Guatemala became embroiled in a US-backed 
civil war and the military began to viciously attack indigenous populations, who 
were believed to be sympathetic to the guerillas and to communism.  Over 
100,000 people were killed in the conflict and over one million people were 
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driven into exile or displaced, an estimated 200,000 of whom fled into southern 
Mexico (Castillo 2006).  These refugees changed Chiapas, both demographically 
and economically.  The local economy boomed with international aid funding and 
the Guatemalan presence in the state became more substantial.  About 22,000 
Guatemalans remained, many becoming naturalized citizens. 
 As in the United States, the southern border of Mexico was for a long time 
completely unregulated, in part to facilitate cross-border trade, family connections, 
and a large seasonal influx of between 45,000 and 75,000 Guatemalan agricultural 
and domestic workers (Castillo 2006).  There are eight official crossing points 
along this border, but over 1,000 blind spots in the mountainous terrain, only 44 
of which are accessible by vehicle.  Some parts of the border are covered with 
dense jungle.  As two reporters who traveled 500 miles of border roads in 2011 
observed: “for the indigenous peoples, ranch hands and smugglers who traverse it 
freely, there is no border at all.  It is a line on the map” (Miroff and Booth 2011).  
The emergence of concerns about border security 
 Mexico’s national government, at US urging, now attempts to differentiate 
between migrants whose labor contributes to the national economy and those 
simply passing through or bent on criminal activities.  In the 1990s Mexico 
liberalized access to business, visitors, investors and seasonal workers, but 
tightened access to visas for Central Americans seeking to move beyond the 
southern border area.  At the national level, Chiapas was beginning to be seen, not 
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just as a venue for cross-border commerce and a way station in the northward 
migration of workers, but as a virtually unguarded entry point into the country.  In 
1998 the government announced a plan to seal the southern border in order to 
control crime and US-bound migration.  Checkpoints were established along 
highways heading north.  To avoid detection, migrants began to ride atop 
northbound freight trains and to cross via remote roads. Isolated from public view, 
they became much more vulnerable to assault and robbery by criminal gangs and 
to extortion by corrupt officials.  
 The Mexican government was caught in a difficult position.  Criticized for 
the injuries, deaths, and assaults that migrants suffered in its territory, it was at the 
same time feeling pressure from the United States to increase security.  For 
President Fox, however, the southern border was primarily a bargaining chip in 
his effort to improve the legal status of Mexicans already settled in the United 
States.  Negotiations between presidents Fox and Bush resulted in the June 2001 
introduction of Plan Sur, a border-fortification project supported in part by US 
funds.  Within fifteen days, 6,000 people had been deported from Mexico (Kovic 
and Kelly 2005).  The number of deportations had begun to grow even before that 
point, however.  Castillo (2006) reports that deportations, mostly of Guatemalans, 
had steadily increased each year beginning in the 1990s, reaching 200,000 by 
2005.  Plan Sur included funds for Grupos Beta, a program that placed a small 
number of immigration agents in border areas to assist migrants in distress.  At 
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about the same time Mexico entered into a separate pilot repatriation plan with 
Guatemala.
vi
 
 The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks added to concerns about the 
porosity of the southern border; that year Mexico deported 147,000 unauthorized 
immigrants, nearly all Central Americans who had come through Chiapas.  As 
The Economist reported in a 2004 article: “The area is seen by American and 
Mexican officials as a new frontier in the war against terror.  Fresh resources have 
gone into policing it” (Economist 2004).  Additional border-control plans were 
adopted in 2005, including a plan to repatriate Salvadoran migrants.v  The 
national migration agency, Instituto Nacional de Migracion (INM) was 
incorporated into the internal security apparatus in 2005, emulating the Homeland 
Security model in the US. (Johnson 2008: 16).   
 Gradually -- and with US encouragement and financial support -- Mexico 
was developing an immigration-enforcement policy focusing on apprehension, 
detention, and expedited deportation of unauthorized immigrants. In 2007, 
Mexico accepted American funds under the Merida Initiative, a $1.6 billion 
package that included $400 million in military and police equipment and training.  
The number of detention centers doubled between 2000 and 2011 (Alba and 
Castillo 2012).  In the wave of concern about national security, human rights and 
protection of migrants were pushed into the background.  As one observer 
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complained: “Political negotiations for the Merida Initiative have neutered 
clauses designed to protect human rights” (Inkpen 2012).    
 Most of the Mexican federal government’s immigration-control programs 
have focused on Chiapas and migration by Central Americans.  Of those migrants 
detained by federal authorities, 95 percent come from Central America.  
Detention centers are also concentrated in Chiapas, particularly in Tapachula, 
which has the nation’s largest, with 960 beds (Diaz and Kuhner 2008).  Many of 
those detained further north are brought to Tapachula in order to board up to 
fifteen buses bound each day for Guatemala.  Two or three 35-person buses go 
daily to Honduras.  
 For immigrants seeking to make their way through Mexico, the most 
serious problem, aside from attacks by criminal gangs, is the likelihood of 
extortion from municipal officials falsely claiming authority to enforce 
immigration law (Rojas 2008). The law clearly states that INM personnel are the 
only agents authorized to enforce immigration law, except in special 
circumstances, but this limitation is widely ignored, creating opportunities for 
municipal, state, and military police, fire department personnel, and even private 
security agents working at places like Sam’s Club to demand money or sexual 
favors.  Extortion and bribes (la mordida) are deeply rooted in Mexico, in part 
because municipal police are very poorly paid and not very professional, 
averaging a 6th grade education. The official in charge of the local office of the 
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International Organization for Migration stationed in Tapachula complained of 
daily stops from local authorities based, he thought, on his Guatemalan license 
plates.  He wore his identification on a retractable chain around his neck to 
prevent police from keeping his papers (Flores 2008).   
 The federal government has been ineffective in responding to problems of 
corruption within its own ranks or among local police.  It has instead opted to 
increase the number of federal border agents and has provided them with broad 
discretion to hold migrants and deny visits from family members.  Nor has 
government taken effective steps to reduce other hazards. The freight railway 
through Chiapas, known variously as “The Beast” or “The Death Express” causes 
many injuries and deaths when migrants attempt to board it on their journey north.  
Drug and contraband trafficking in the area continue to weaken local government 
through corruption and bribes.  Human trafficking and smuggling and gang 
violence directed against migrants are also rampant, with (Inkpen 2012).  Some of 
these problems could be diminished with more effective law enforcement, yet as 
of 2011 only about $20 million of the $1.6 billion Plan Merida aid package had 
been assigned to security for the southern border.   
 Shocking attacks against migrants in 2010 and 2011 by organized crime 
groups finally made immigration reform a top priority in the national Congress.  
In April 2011 the Mexican legislature unanimously approved a comprehensive 
law that de-criminalized migration and facilitates movement of people across the 
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country.  A month later President Calderon signed the legislation, citing the 
demand for immigrant labor and the goals of family unification and equal 
treatment of all residents.   
 Regulations for the new law have been drafted, but still not fully 
implemented at the local level.  Some observers doubt that, even when the 
necessary procedures are announced, they will have much impact because of 
corruption within the INM, rampant crime, and other challenges (Castillo 2011). 
In the words of Atilano Moreno, leader of a rural communal village hugging the 
border with Guatemala: “There are two powers here: the soldiers and the 
criminals.  We’re caught between them” (Miroff and Booth 2011). 
 One observer describes Mexico’s responses to the challenges of 
unauthorized migration as evolving, but often “reactive, uncoordinated, and 
sometimes contradictory” (MPI 2011).  Thus Mexico encourages immigrants to 
regularize their status, but makes the process complicated and costly.  Fees can be 
reduced upon a showing of poverty, but passports now are required, increasing the 
cost of the process.  The new immigration law embraces family reunification as a 
goal of immigration policy, but requires a job offer in Mexico and does not 
necessarily recognize having a spouse or child who is a Mexican citizen as 
sufficient evidence of attachment.  Children born in Mexico are supposed to 
become citizens automatically, but some judges reportedly refuse to sign birth 
certificates of babies born of unauthorized immigrants.  The INM must approve 
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marriages with a foreigner, and makes it almost impossible for anyone who has 
been picked up by the police to get regularized.  A legal immigrant must renew 
his or her permiso yearly and be sure to inform the INM of any job changes, 
departures from the country, or change in marital or familial status.  Since 2008, 
visas for local visitors and local temporary workers have been available in 
Chiapas and neighboring states, but the government has done little to prevent 
local authorities from continuing to harass immigrants.  The temporary workers 
based in Chiapas tend to be poor, mostly male, and young, often working on 
farms or in construction or selling goods on city streets; over a fifth cannot read or 
write and have no schooling (Cruz 2011).    Rojas reports that immigrants without 
documentation who have settled in Mexico fear of contact with authorities and are 
largely unaware of the INM’s regularization program (Rojas 2011).  
Migrant advocates craft their protest through (human rights) law  
 Alba and Castillo describe Mexican civil-society groups as playing a 
powerful role in advocating for migrants, often providing humanitarian assistance 
and legal services to detained migrants.  This is a relatively new development 
brought about, they suggest, by the influx of refugees from Central America 
during the 1980s (2012, 7).  Still, some of the problems appear intractable, 
including extortion by municipal and state-level police, fostered by a long 
tradition of personalismo, and drug-related crime and trafficking.  The INM is 
widely viewed as corrupt.  Underinvestment in the region keeps Chiapas poor and 
 30 
vulnerable to abuses.  In the words of one protester: “This frontier is a forgotten 
place, a little hell of violence, illegality, and corrupt institutions that permit 
this…” (Todo por Ellos 2012).   
 Public opinion is not on the side of migrants.   Despite their willingness to 
hire them for domestic service and agricultural work at rock-bottom rates, 
attitudes in the Chiapas area are consistent with those across the nation, with 
nearly half of the Mexican population opposing immigration (2010).  The 
treatment of migrants has nevertheless attracted protests in Chiapas, including a 
1997 hunger strike and a number of formal complaints of harsh security measures.  
In 2012, activists held an eight-day demonstration in Tapachula, including a 
hunger strike, to draw attention to the abuses and corruption among federal 
immigration officials stationed in the area.  A group of local organizations has 
formed an immigration policy working-group (El Grupo de Trabajo sobre 
Politica Migratoria) that includes the Fray Matias de Córdova Human Rights 
Center (El Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Matías), an immigrant-assisting 
organization with long roots in the area.  Various organizations in San Cristóbal 
de Las Casas are promoting the creation of bi-national networks of civil society 
organizations to push Mexico toward compliance with its international obligations 
toward migrants.   
 These groups are critical of the new immigration law and its continued 
focus on migration as a national security issue.  The law gives the Secretary of 
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Public Security a significant role in enforcement, permits warrantless searches, 
and provides enforcement officials with virtually unlimited discretion.  In effect, 
these groups complain, nothing has changed.  Periods of detention are growing 
longer and migrants continue to be seen as a threat, with the law putting more 
residents than ever into an irregular status.  
 The Mexican government has not been entirely deaf to human-rights 
concerns.  In 2002, in response to pressure to improve its human-rights record, it 
established an independent agency to respond to human-rights violations, 
Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos (National Human Rights Commission 
or CNDH).  The Commission’s office in Tapachula investigated 336 cases in its 
first six years of operation, taking up many of the complaints gathered by the Fray 
Matias de Córdova Human Rights Center (Beltran 2008).  Members of the local 
CNDH office visit the Tapachula detention center every day to take complaints 
and check on conditions.  The Commission established a new special inspector 
general in 2005 and has gotten some improvements from INM authorities.  It also 
seeks to advise migrants of the dangers they face in crossing Mexican national 
territory and offers recommendations to the Chiapas government as well as to 
federal authorities (García 2008, Alba and Castillo 2012). 
 The record of the government of Chiapas is mixed.  The state’s law 
enforcement officials continue to extort money and favors from migrants, but the 
state legislature has taken some positive actions.  Chiapas adopted an anti-
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discrimination law to protect the rights of the immigrant population. In 2007, 
Chiapas revised its civil code to permit the registration of children born in 
Chiapas without distinction as to the migratory status of their parents.
 
 To pursue 
those who commit crimes against migrants, the state government created a special 
prosecutor.  In these respects Chiapas is outpacing the federal government and, in 
a small way, pushing back against its laissez-faire policies.   
 Appeals to legality have figured prominently in all of these efforts.  
Legality as an organizing principle and justification figures significantly even in 
some extra-legal institutions, including the unofficial crossing points, or cadenas 
that some communities on the border have developed.  Tolls collected in this 
manner can amount to as much as $60,000 per year Meyers-Galemba reports. 
Locals pride themselves on their honesty and transparency, noting that they offer 
fair value (road maintenance) for the toll, in contrast with corruption and extortion 
at the hands of official border agents.  As one observed: “There is law here” 
(Meyers-Galemba 2012, 7). 
FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTER: SPEAKING UP THROUGH LAW 
 The growing power of national governments to intervene in local affairs in 
the name of sovereignty and security is particularly evident in border areas, but so 
are certain limits arising out of local desires to restore a fluid transnationalism.  
The economic, social, and cultural value of easy flows across borders has not 
diminished with time, and has perhaps increased with globalization.  The stark 
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territorial reality of borders, however, traps thinking and obscure the fundamental 
question we should be asking (Agnew 2008, 176, 187): What do borders do to 
people and for people?  I suggest that we should also be asking how borderlands 
residents manage the challenges thrust upon them by their national governments.   
 In both Chiapas and Arizona, as we have seen, the contemporary response 
to national immigration policies arises out of a deep reservoir of discontent with 
past treatment by the national government.  Nor has either area benefitted from 
the current emphasis on securitization, with its inevitable accompaniments of 
increased border-related crime, drug running, corruption, and oppressive policing.  
Both local economies have also suffered as controls have been tightened.   
 Arizona and Chiapas are responding with legalized politics and protest, 
albeit with very different goals in mind, as we have seen.  For activists in Chiapas, 
the biggest obstacle is their government’s inability to operate within the 
parameters of law.  The struggle in Arizona is over whose law will prevail, the 
contenders being municipal, state, federal, and international human-rights law.  
The availability of law on every side of the debate over border policy signifies, 
not just the flexibility of law, but also its plurality and our reliance upon it to 
justify behavior.  It should not be surprising, therefore, that there is widespread 
public anxiety over those who “take the law into their own hands” by entering 
national territory without permission.  
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 Law, of course, does not operate without context.  The structure of the 
nation state determines, to a significant extent, the capacity of the local level to 
speak loudly, and sometimes persuasively, to higher authorities.  In Mexico this 
capacity is constrained by reluctance to devolve authority and financial resources 
to the nation’s 32 states.  Despite President Vincent Fox’s campaign pledge to 
empower the states, basic reforms have been few, hampered by the tradition of 
centralized governance and fear that long-standing problems of government 
corruption would multiply with dispersed authority (Merchant 2003, Emmond  
2007).  It was not even clear until the 1995 federal constitutional revision that 
Mexico’s courts have the power to resolve conflicts between federal and state 
legislation (Emmond 2007: 662).  Nor do voters in Mexico, in sharp contrast with 
many states in the United States, have the capacity to exercise grass-roots 
leadership through local initiatives or referenda. Chiapas, with its pervasive 
poverty in the face of environmental riches that have greatly benefited the nation 
as a whole, offers a particularly poignant example of the incapacity of local 
residents to be heard at the national level. 
 The situation in Arizona could hardly be more different.  American 
federalism, growing out of a confederation of states, constrains the national level 
and reserves some powers to the states.  Judicial review has been available since 
the earliest years of the Republic to sort out conflicts over state v. national 
authority.  This is a recipe for a contentious political system, and that is what has 
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prevailed since the nation’s inception, with the Supreme Court considering 
federalism disputes on a regular basis.   
 Arizona has, from its earliest years, taken full advantage of this situation 
by passing non-conforming legislation and by suing to contest the federal 
government’s power to impose air pollution standards, voting requirements, 
school diversity policy, and most recently, health-insurance requirements.  The 
2013 legislative session included a proposal to refuse to abide by any federal 
policy the state legislature does not like.  Arizona’s effort to reshape national 
immigration policy is consistent with this approach, justified by the theory of  
“dual federalism,” under which states and the U.S. government operate as two 
sovereigns with occasionally overlapping jurisdiction.    
 Non-governmental organizations in Arizona also have advantages not 
available to similar organizations in Chiapas.  A long tradition of social-
movement activity and the availability of out-of-state support facilitate their 
activism.  The state’s harsh approach toward unauthorized immigrants has 
energized these efforts.  Still, the state government has an easier time getting 
national attention because of its ability to enact laws like SB1070.  The Arizona 
case is a reminder that the capacity of localities to “speak back” to federal power 
with their own legislation does not always work in favor of progressive change.  
As Varsanyi has pointed out, neo-liberal national policies may provoke an even 
more regressive reaction at the local level, illustrating her point with Hazelton 
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Pennsylvania’s law requiring legal status to work and live in the city (2010).   
Immigration policy is ripe for challenge from below because, while the plenary 
power of the national government has been clearly established by the courts, the 
effects of immigration policy are mostly felt at the local level.   
 If Arizona’s goal was, not to replace federal law, but to move the national 
conversation toward a more restrictive direction, it has succeeded, at least 
temporarily.  Consider this statement by the eight U.S. senators who in January 
2013 proposed to revise federal immigration law.  In it they deferred to the 
judgment of Arizona and other Southwest-border states: 
We recognize that Americans living along the Southwest border are key to 
recognizing and understanding when the border is truly secure. Our 
legislation will create a commission comprised of governors, attorneys 
general, and community leaders living along the Southwest border to 
monitor the progress of securing our border and to make a 
recommendation regarding when the bill's security measures outlined in 
the legislation are completed (Fabian 2013). 
 In the always-controversial realm of immigration policy, this pattern of 
deference at the margins and control at the center is likely become the new 
securitization norm.  For example, the increasing devolution of enforcement 
authority to the local level, as epitomized by the federal rollout of the Secure 
Communities program, actually enhances federal discretion over deportation.  
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Similarly in Chiapas, the decision to allow the cadenas to admit border crossers 
on their own terms enhances the impression of federal control by calming local 
protest and helping to make the official crossing points look more effective.  
Nation states have never enjoyed as much power to control borders as they have 
claimed, but it is important to maintain that illusion.  The legalized politics around 
the border must contend with that reality. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i
 This pattern was the same throughout the 2000-mile length of the southwest 
border. The U.S. Government Accountability Office estimated that border-
crossing deaths across the southwest border with Mexico had doubled between 
1995 and 2006 (USGAO 2006).   
ii
 Ingrid V. Eagly has usefully outlined the provisions of this law and its 
tremendous power in detecting and deporting unauthorized immigrants (2011). 
iii
 As in many western states, propositions appear on Arizona ballots either 
through the referendum process, in which the legislature puts its proposals before 
the voters, or through the initiative process, which begins with a petition 
submitted by citizens.   
iv
 The original title of the law, Fair and Legal Employment Act (FLEA) was 
subsequently renamed the Legal Arizona Workers Act.  It became effective on 
January 1, 2008.  
v
 Acuerdo para la Repatriación Ordenada, Ágil, y Segura de Migrantes 
Salvadoreños via Terrestre (May 2005); Acuerdo para la Repatriación Segura y 
Ordenada de Migrantes Centroamericanos en las Fronteras de México y 
Guatemala (June 2005). 
